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MAHENDRA LAWOTI WESTERN MICHIGAN UNIVERSITY, KALAMAZOO 
CENTRALI ZING POLITICS AN D THE GROWTH OF THE 
MAOIST INSURGENCY IN NEPAL1 
This article argues that the over centralization of politics in Nepal contributed in the initiation 
and the growth of the Maoist insurgency. The centralized unitary state structure, hegemonic 
executive, powerful political parties and dominant leaders, and ethnic centralization led to ex-
treme power concentration in the cabinet, which was controlled by a small group of political elite 
hailing from the dominant group (male Chettri-Bahun) . The over centralization of state power 
and centralizing political culture fostered widespread power abuse and corruption, undermined 
accountability, caused neglect and underdevelopment of periphery, alienated minorities, and 
squandered opportunities to form coalition among mainstream political forces to resist the Maoists. 
The repression and exclusion pushed the Maoists into the insurgency, the absence of state agen-
cies in the rural regions made it easy for the l\hoist to operate, and the alienated people provided 
the support base for growth of the insurgency. This article argues that the over centralization 
of politics in Nepal contributed in the initiation and the growth of the Maoist insurgency. The 
centralized unitary state structure, hegemonic executive, powerfu l political parties and dominant 
leaders, and ethnic centralization led to extreme power concentration in the cabinet, which was 
controlled by a small group of political elite hailing from the dominant group (male Chettri-Ba-
hun). The over centralization of state power and centralizing political culture fostered widespread 
power abuse and corruption, undermined accountability, caused neglect and underdevelopment 
of periphery, alienated minorities, and squandered opportun ities to form coalition among main-
stream political forces to resist the Maoists. The repression and exclusion pushed the Maoists 
into the insurgency, the absence of state agencies in the rural regions made it easy for the Mao-
ist to operate, and the alienated people provided the support base for growth of the insurgency. 
INTRODUCTION 
Scholars and other commentators have cited a va-
riety of explanations for the Maoist insurrection in 
Nepal, from ideological and personal power strug-
gles within Marxist political parties, to failed devel-
opment programs, to structural inequities favoring 
high castes (Lawoti 200lc; Shah 2001; Bhurtel 2002; 
Maharjan 2000; Neupane 2001; Shneiderman and 
Turin 2004; Gellner 2003; Bhattachan 2000a; de 
Sales 2003; Thapa 2001). No one, however, has yet 
analyzed how the formal and informal structure of 
the Nepali State has affected the growth of the insur-
gency. To fill this void and add to our understanding 
of Nepal's fratricidal war, I will explore the structure 
of the state and factors that affect it in this paper. 
power abuse, rampant corruption, non-performance 
of duties by government workers, and alienation 
of the citizenry-all of which contributed to the 
growth of the insurgency. Third, I will suggest how 
events might have evolved differently if the Nepali 
State and politics had been organized to give power 
to district and village-level government agents (or to 
regions by establishing a federal state) and to locally 
elected officials who were accountable to the public. 
I conclude with my central argument that excessive 
centralization without democratic accountability 
leads to failed government, alienated citizens, and 
ultimately, to violent protest. 
First, I describe the ways the constitution of the 
"democracy" period (1990-2002) created a highly 
centralized state, with power concentrated in the ex-
ecutive (cabinet) and a small group of political actors. 
Second, I show how this centralized politics led to 
The period I discuss is the "democracy" period, be-
tween April1990 when a popular uprising forced the 
king to allow political parties to form and compete 
in elections, and October 4, 2002 when a new king 
dismissed the elected government and appointed a 
caretaker government. The 1990 uprising not only 
led to the chance for political parties to contend for 
control of the government, but also expanded civil 
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rights and reduced state repression of political discourse . The 
new freedoms allowed citizens to d iscuss openly the inequali-
ties of life in Nepal, without offering them the economic and 
poli tica l opportunities to improve their lives . The primary 
factor clisempowering the citi zenry was the centralized sys-
tem of power distribution created by the 1990 Constitution. 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE 
Democratic Models and Institutional Variation 
Empirical analyses describe democracies as majoritarian or 
consensus (lijphart 1984, 1999). In majoritarian systems the 
party with the most votes, even when it lacks a majority, gets 
all or most of the power of the state. Such systems usually 
have only two parties competing for control, a unitary sys-
tem, and a dominant executive. The United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and Botswana are examples of this model. Consen-
sus systems, on the other hand, share povver. Power sharing 
occurs when parties form coalition governments, when the 
state apparatus includes two balanced Parliamentary houses, 
or when the central government shares power with regional 
and local elected bodies, as in federalism. The institutions 
frequently associated with consensus state structures are 
proportional representation, more than two dominant po-
litical parties, federa lism, and guarantees protecting minority 
rights. Switzerland and Belgium are examples of consensus 
systems. Many countries, such as the USA, India , Sweden , 
Norway, and Canada, combine majoritarian and consensus 
institutions. 
The majoritarian model can only address problems of non-
plural societies in which a single clivisionsuch as class differ-
ences between workers and the rich dominates. On the other 
hand, the consensus model works in societies with multiple 
divisions, such as those between several ethnic groups, or be-
tween both cultural and class entit ies (lijphart 1984, 1999). 
In attempts to deepen their democracies, even the prototype 
majoritarian governments have begun to adopt some consen-
sus institutions: Britain has devolved power to the regions 
and ser iously considered adopting a proportional-representa-
tion electoral method. New Zealand adopted the proportional 
electoral process in the mid nineties. 
lijphart (1999) identifies ten political elements that dis-
tinguish these models, including the degree of central-
ized authority, the type of executive, the electoral system, 
the cameral structure, the structure and role of th~ central 
bank, the constitutional amendment procedure, the judicial 
review process, and the roles of interest groups. In Nepal, 
these political institutions are highly majoritarian and hence 
they concentrate power. In fact, Nepali political institutions 
are more majoritarian than those of the prototype UK and 
New Zealand.2 The consequence has been the political exclu-
50 
sion of socio-cultural, ideological opposition, and lower class 
groups (lawoti 2002 b). l focus on the two major institution-
sthat concer1trate power: the unitary state structure and the 
executive. 
The Unitary and Centralized State in Nepal 
Nepal has a unitary state structure; this affects the power 
distribution of the society in two ways. First, the unitary 
structure of the state has meant that autonomous regional 
governments do not exist. Second, even the minimal power 
enjoyed by the districts and local governments is dependent 
upon the central government, as was shown in 2001 when 
the center appointed regional administrators throughout the 
country. The power of the center in this unitary structure can 
be better understood by contrasting it with a federal system, 
in which the regional governments have a significant amount 
of power guaranteed by the constitution, so the center can-
neither overrule the regions' decisions nor take away their 
powers. Thus, regional and local governments may hold 
substantial taxing authority and maintain their own police 
forces. In unitary Nepal, on the other hand, the police and 
civil administration are all under the control of the centra l 
government. 
A unitary polity can be decentralized, which means that 
the center allocates to regional or local entities some of its 
power. Finland, Norway, Denmark, and japan illustrate this. 
However, as discussed earlier, the center can take away power 
from the local governments in a unitary state,though not in a 
federal state . Additionally, the federal states can provide au-
tonomy to ethnic/cultural groups. The Nepali State is highly 
centralized and has given local governments very little power 
and virtually no responsibility for delivering services3 Even 
when some authority is delegated to the local governments, 
such as the right to collect taxes, it is negligible. In fact, the 
center's power in Nepal is further concentrated because of its 
high degree of monopoly over revenue collections and distri-
bution, making local governments dependent on the cener for 
resources and aid . In arenas such as education and culture, 
Kathmandu has almost monopolistic power over policy for-
mulation and implementation. For instance, the educational 
curriculum for the whole country is set at the center, and 
local governments have to get permission from the central 
government or its line agencies to decide even small matters. 
A comparative study of power distribution gives a perspective 
on the Nepali case. 
POWER DISTRIBUTION IN NEPAL: A COMPARATIVE 
PERSPECTIVE 
Nepal has initiated a number of decentralization schemes 
since the sixties, but the actual devolution of power is mini-
mal (Dahal 1996). The Self Governance Act of the 2055 v.s. 
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Degrees of Federalism and Established Democracies plus Nepal~ 
Decentralization 
5: Federal & clecenLrahzed Australia, Belgium (after 1993), Canada, Germany, Switzerland, US 
4: Federal & centralized Austria (4.5), India (4.5), Venezuela 
3: Semi federal Belgium (before 1993), Israel, Netherlands, Papua New Gtli.nea, Spain, 
2: Unitary & decentralized Denmark, Finland, Japan, Norway, Sweden 
1: Unitary & centralized Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Colombia, Costa Rica, France (1.2), Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy (1.3), jamaica, Luxembourg, Malta, Mautitius, Nepal, 
New Zeala11cl, Portugal, Ttinidad (1.2) , United Kingdom 
Table 1. Degrees of Decentralization in 36 Democracies and Nepal (1900-2001) 
Italicized countries had population less than 5,000,000 in 1995. Bold are culturally plural countries. Nepal 's rank is an average of assessments 
made by me and two other Nepali decentralization experts. Source: Lijphart (1999) and Lawoti (2003 b) for Nepal. 
gave more power to local governments than previous acts, but 
the actual authority allowed is still tiny (NKBBS 2055 v.s). 
Comparing Nepal across time does not give a useful picture; 
to find out how power is distributed in Nepal, one has to 
compare Nepal with other countries (Table l). 
Table 1 is based on an index of power sharing devised by 
Lijphart (1999). lt gives ratings of 36 democratic countries 
and Nepal for intergovernmental power distribution. The 
most devolved polity, ranked 5, is both federal and decen-
tralized. The second most devolved, ranked 4, is federal but 
centralized. Semi-federal systems are ranked 3, while unitary 
and decentralized system rank 2. The least devolved, ranked 
1, is both unitary and centralized. 
Table 1 reveals that Nepal is one of the least decentralized 
countries. Despite a number of decentralization initiatives, 
decentralization level remains at index l. lf there had been a 
lower index, Nepal would probably have received it; index 1 
group contains more decentralized polities than Nepal, such 
as the UK andltaly. ln the UK, the local governments receive 
substantial funding from revenue collected by the center, and 
in Italy a lot of power has devolved to regional governments 
(Putnam 1993). 
Additionally, the unitary and centralized structure of Ne-
pal is distinctly unable to accommodate the country's ethnic 
diversity, a factor best accommodated by federal democra-
cies (with indices of 3 to 5). ln sum, this analysis shows two 
things: first , power is highly concentrated in Nepal because of 
the state structure; second, the unitary state structure rnakes 
achieving a desirable level of decentralization impossible. 
THE HEGEMONIC EXECUTIVE 
Not only does the unitary structure of the state concentrate 
power, but virtually all that power is also centralized within 
one institution, the executive. Only the executive, i.e., the 
cabinet, is empowered to introduce legislation that affects fi-
nances (HMG Nepal1990), so the cabinet effectively controls 
all legislation and its implementation. In other Parliamentary 
democracies (Germany, Belgium etc.), substantial legislation 
with budgetary provisions can also be introduced by mem-
bers of Parliament. 
Further, until 2002 no governmental entity, not even 
the Commission for Investigation of Abuse and Authority 
(ClAA) , could challenge or review the decisions and policies 
of the cabinet. For example, when the cabinet awarded ex-
cessive amounts of money to contractors for infrastructure 
projects, a practice that occurred repeatedly through all of the 
administrations that ruled during the 12 "democracy" years, 
the ClAA could not investigate vvhat was defined as a "policy 
decision." lt is alleged that many powerful cabinet members 
became rich on this provision. Another example of cabinet's 
extreme power is that, in one instance in mid 1990, the cabi-
net withdrew an election-related murder charge against one 
of its members. 
The strength of the executive is enhanced because the ex-
ecutive either directly or indirectly controls the budgets and 
personnel appointments of the other branches of government 
and of "independent" constitutional commissions. Likewise, 
the executive can also influence the performance of the ju-
diciary, which is otherwise relatively independent , through 
budgetary and personnel decisions. The role of the strong 
judiciary, on the other hand, is limited in practical terms be-
cause it can only assert its power when the contesting parties 
bring constitutional matters to its attention. 
The royal palace might be considered a countervailing force 
that could constrain the power of the executive. However, 
during the 12 years considered here, the royal palace did not 
intervene in the daily and policy level activities of the govern-
ment. lt seemed satisfied with guarding the power that the 
1990 Constitution gave it, and with appointing its loyalists as 
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ambassadors and members (10) to the Upper House. Palace 
interventions have not directly favored the poor and under-
privileged groups, except for the regular appointments of a 
few dalit (traditionally considered 'low caste and untouch-
able'), indigenous nationalities (adibasi janajati), and women 
to the Upper House. 
On the other hand, if the interests of the executive and 
palace are congruent, the centralization becomes even more 
severe. In a later section, I argue that in cultural matters, the 
state became even more hegemonic because of the common 
interests of the cabinet, the royal palace, the judiciary, and 
other central agencies-all of which were dominated by high 
caste hill Hindu elite males. 
The irony of the Nepali State, however, is that even though 
it is highly centralized, it is weak and limited. The concentra-
tion of power at the center does not mean that the state is 
powerful, it only means that whatever power the state pos-
sesses is concentrated at the center. As such, the state's reach 
and influence in development, service delivery, administra-
tion, and security is severely limited. The state does not have 
any effective presence in many sectors and regions. Even at 
the center, it has failed to carry out efficiently its responsibili-
ties, such as collecting taxes, providing security, and main-
taining law and order. However, in arenas where it intersects 
with local bodies and non-state agencies, the center often has 
the upper hand. The consequence is that the center is pow-
erful compared to the local and non-state agencies, but it is 
absolutely weak because it has no effective presence through 
much of its territory due to, among other reasons, powerless 
local and district governments. 
THE CENTRALIZED POLITICAL CULTURE 
Powerful Parties and Dominant Leaders 
The power taken away from the king in 1990 was mostly 
transferred to the political parties and political leaders, not 
to the people (Brown 1996). The leaders' power comes from 
their actual or potential control of the executive and from their 
ability to appoint their party members to positions of author-
ity. The party leaders' powers are further enhanced because 
the agencies and institutions that wield countervailing power 
in most societies, groups like trade unions, professional as-
sociations, human rights groups, and civic organizations, are 
either weak or under the influence of the political parties in 
Nepal5 (Bhattachan 1999 b). 
The political leaders, especially the top leadership, can ex-
ercise unrestrained power, appointing syncophants to admin-
istrative posts, ignoring party rules and procedures, and often 
governing on their personal whims.· The leaders nominate 
at least half the central committee members, often relatives 
(such as in the NC), friends, and/or caste brethrens (as in the 
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CPN-UML). The appointees, in turn, remain personally loyal 
to the leaders. Leaders may also appoint party candidates for 
parliamentary, local, and organization elections. This central-
izing political culture can eviscerate local party organizations 
and marginalize competent but more independently minded 
members. Local leaders often compete to please the central 
leadership, thereby further reinforcing centralization. 
ETHNIC CENTRALIZATION 
Many of Nepal's ethnic groups have no real access to the 
state and other influential institutions in Nepal. The numbers 
of dalit6 , indigenous nationalities7, women, and madhesi8 in 
the influential institutions are negligible, and reduced since 
the panchayat and the first parliamentary (1959-60) eras 
(Lawoti 2002, Neupane 2000; NESAC 1998; Gurung 1998). 
High caste Hindu elite males from the hills (Caste Hill Hindu 
Elites- CHHE) overwhelmingly dominate power positions in 
politics, administration, the judiciary, parliament, academia, 
civil society, industry/commerce, local government, and ed-
ucation. jointly the CHHE and Newar9 were 37.2 % of the 
population, but in 1999 they held more than 80% of leader-
ship positions (CHHE 66% and Newar 15%) in the important 
arenas of governance (Neupane 2000). 
The interesting point about this CHHE domination is that 
even the relatively progressive realms such as media, civil 
society, and human rights demonstrate the same absence of 
minority exclusion (Neupane 2000; NESAC 1998; Gurung 
1998; Onta and Parajuli 2058 v.s.; Lawoti and Yatru 2001; 
Lawoti 2000a). The mainstream media dominated by the 
CHHE group is often responsible for spreading stereotypes 
about minorities and misrepresenting their issues (Kraemer 
2003; Thapa-Magar 2000 a; Lawoti and Yatru 2001). 
In sum, the centralizing state structure and centralized po-
litical culture have concentrated power in the hands of several 
small ethnic/caste groups and excluded the majority of the 
population from meaningful participation. No wonder then 
that the lack of democratic opportunity has induced apathy 
in the wider population and the explosive expansion of the 
Maoist insurrection . 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE CENTRALIZED POLITY 
The Centralized State and the Underdevelopment of the 
Periphery 
One consequence of the centralized state has been the un-
derdevelopment of the rural areas, where nearly 90 percent 
of the people live. The central authorities either ignore or are 
unaware of the needs of these rural residents. As noted above, 
regional representatives in Parliament lack power to represent 
rural aspirations effectively, and local agencies are without 
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authority and resources. This neglect has created huge in-
equalities. For example, in 1991 life expectancy in Mugu in 
remote northwestern Nepal, was 37 years; it was 7l years in 
Kathmandu (Thapa 1992). 
The rural regions not only suffer from inadequate pro-
grams, policies, and budget, but they have no role in planning 
or implementing development projects. This centralized con-
trolinakes it likely that projects will not fulfill the needs of 
the people or produce sustainable results . Yet local elites who 
are connected to the center benefit from these rare services. 
For example, justice (1986: 24) found that the few health 
programs provided by the center were usually located where 
the local elites ·would benefit from them. These failures have 
alienated rural people to the point that they are susceptible to 
the Maoists' promises of radical transformation. No wonder 
then that the Maoist insurgency began from the mid-west, 
one of the most neglected and isolated regions in Nepal. 
Another consequence of the centralization is that the cen-
tral authorities, especially the cabinet members and adminis-
trators, are bogged down by minor decisions and details, such 
as when central bureaucrats must decide whether distant 
schools will receive tin roofs worth a few hundred dollars. 
Inefficiency is further intensified because local community 
leaders must go to Kathmandu and lobby these officials for 
the roofs with gifts . Parliamentary representatives also must 
waste their time in such lobbying. 
Scholars have argued that federalism enhances economic 
growth by fostering competition for investment among re-
gions, leading to efficiency and market development (We-
ingast 1995; Bohora 2002). Moreover, devolution of power 
to local people, as occurs in federal states, is more efficient 
because locals are more familiar with the issues, needs, and 
resources in the village. Finally, devolved decision-making 
facilitates economic development and generates employment, 
giving people a stake in the existing system and reducing 
alienation among the rural people. 
The Lack of Penetration of the State and its Consequences 
The irony of Nepali centralization is that the state has no 
reach beyond district and sub district centers. This has allowed 
the Maoists to establish themselves easily in the rural areas 
because no state agencies are present to resist them. When 
the people saw the police and other agencies like banks and 
agricultural extension services leaving rural areas because of 
the }.1laoist threat, they further lost faith in the government. 
Even the people who opposed the Maoist ideology did not 
dare resist publicly because they realized that the state could 
not guarantee their security. However, the Maoists have not 
been able to take over positions where the government has 
been determined to stay, such as the district headquarters. 
This indicates that the growth of the Maoists is largely a con-
sequence of the absence of the state in the periphery. 
The Lack of Horizontal Accountability and Power Abuse 
The extreme centralization of power within the executive 
has resulted in an absence of accountability. We can distin-
guish horizontal accountability, where the executive is ac-
countable to independent central authorities, and vertical 
accountability, where the voters hold leaders accountable dur-
ing periodic elections. In democracies the constitution gener-
ally establishes state agencies, such as the election commission 
and investigative commissions, to ensure fair elections and 
investigate and punish misbehavior by the executive and oth-
er central agencies (O'Donnell 1999). In Nepal, however, the 
election commission and the Commission for Investigation 
of Abuse and Authority (CIAA) were under the influence of 
the executive, so they failed in their missions. In the absence 
of check and balances, a culture of power abuse pervaded 
the political circle and administration, fuelling wider corrup-
tion. 10 The necessity to pay bribes for regular state services, 
such as driver's licenses and passports, undermined people's 
faith in the authorities and the system. 
Similarly, though the ruling parties have been able to 
manipulate illegally the electoral process, but the election 
commission has failed to control it. These cases reduced the 
legitimacy of the 1990 democracy in the eyes of the people 
and alienated them from the regime. It prepared the ground 
for an alternative ideology-that of the Maoists-attractive 
to the alienated people. Public opinion surveys in 1999 and 
2001 illustrate this alienation. In 1999 a survey showed that 
ordinary people did not consider the Maoists to be one of the 
top three problems faced by Nepal (Himal Association 2001; 
Sharma and Sen 2056 v.s), even though the leaders, intelli-
gentsia, and the journalists were crying themselves hoarse 
against the rebels. This discrepancy indicates that the people 
did not at that time disapprove of an insurgency that the elite 
labeled a major enemy. 11 
The growth of the Maoists in the more neglected regions 
also supports the thesis that alienation is a factor in their ex-
pansion. The midwest, the hotbed of the insurgency, is one 
of the most neglected regions. Likewise, politically excluded 
groups like the women, indigenous nationalities, and dalit 
have been found to support the insurgency in higher numbers 
(Lawoti 2003). 
As the central administration has ignored the needs of the 
local people, the people in turn have not supported them. 
This is evident in the failure of local people to inform the 
government about Maoist movements and activities. In some 
attacks the Maoists have gathered in hundreds or even thou-
sands of fighters, but the administration remained unaware 
of the mobilization because local people do not inform them. 
Yet ordinary citizens in the district headquarters were aware 
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of the imminent attacks and fl ed their houses for sa fety dur-
ing the raids. The small number of local residents of distr ict 
headquarters killed or injured in the attacks supports this 
conclusion .12 
An administration not made up of local leaders does not 
receive local support to resist the Maoist expansion. 13 Local 
leaders could have pitted the major political parties against 
the Maoists, hindering Maoist growth. Additionally, an ad-
ministration headed by local leaders could have avoided many 
of the unnecessarily repressive acts of the government, which 
pushed people in the middle into the insurgency. 
Centralization and Civil Strife 
Empirical studies covering a large number of countries 
have demonstrated that unitary and centralized states are 
prone to rebellions, whereas federal countries are prone to 
conflicts of less severity, such as protests (Cohen 1997; Sa ide-
man et al. 2002). The reason for the different outcomes is 
that federalism, with multiple levels of governments, creates 
multiple power centers that dissatisfied and mobilized groups 
can access to attain their goals. Access allow groups to air 
and sometimes resolve their grievances, thereby preventing 
dissatisfaction from escalating into rebellion. Unitary states, 
on the other hand, provide few points at which the people 
can express their grievances, which may deepen and some-
times turn into rebellion . The peoples' grievances in Nepal 
were many and were seldom addressed because, among other 
things, the people had no place to go to complain. In such 
circumstances, the Maoists who promised to work for the 
welfare of the poor and marginalized people, attracted those 
who felt excluded by the state . 
Likew ise, scholars have found that consensus (propor-
tional) electoral systems help to manage conflicts, whereas 
the majoritarian (first-past-the-post) systems, which have 
been used for parliamentary and local elections in Nepal, are 
significantly associated vvith violent conflicts (Powell 1981; 
Cohen 1997; Saideman et al. 2002). The majoritarian system 
facilitates conflicts in culturally plural societies for two rea-
sons. First, they promote concentration of power by giving the 
larger parties more seats than are proportional to their vote 
totals, as we saw in Nepal's last three elections. Second, they 
undermine smaller parties by providing no seats in Parlia-
ment to parties with notable vote totals. In the 1999 general 
elections CPN-ML and RPP-C did not get a singl.e seat in the 
Lower House even though they had rece ived 6 percep.t and 3 
percent of votes respectively. 
In Nepal, the centralized polity worked to fuel rebellion in 
other ways as well. Prior to the initiation of the insurgency in 
1996, the Nepali Congress government jailed and tortured 
the activists and leaders of the Maoist poiitical party (United 
People's Front Nepal, UPFN), in their stronghold of Rolpa and 
Rukum, including the elected official of the district develop-
ment committees.14 The power abuse by the central author-
ity; which controls the police and administration, though 
designed to help the NC, helped to push the Maoists into 
the insurgency (INSEC 1999; Prachanda 1999). This repres-
sion could take place because of the unitary and centralized 
structure of the state. If there had been regional governments 
or if the police force had been under the district governments, 
the extensive one-way abuse of power by the center would 
not have been possible. After all, the Maoists controlled the 
district government in Rolpa while the NC controlled the cen-
ter. Without this state repression, the insurgency might have 
been avoided. 
Non-Power Sharing Attitude and Absence of Compromises 
The desire to confine power within one's party or faction 
has led to many opportunities being squandered, at both 
the national level and within the parties. For instance, the 
Deuba government of the NC thought that the situation had 
deteriorated enough to declare the state emergency in 2001, 
but did not choose to form an all-party national government 
to face the crises. In countries around the world, emergency 
cabinets are often formed in times of crises (Lijphart 1999). 
In Nepal, the CPN-UML leaders, as communists, would have 
been useful cabinet partners for tackling the Maoists because 
they understand better the strategies, tools, and psyche of the 
Maoists leaders and cadres. This knowledge might have been 
more effective to counter the Maoists in their initial stages of 
growth. Likewise, the lack of inclusion of the other politi-
cal parties in the dialogue with the Maoists and the lack of 
consultation with them in the declaration of the emergency 
indicates the government's unwillingness to share power and 
authority. This attitude was also apparent earlier in the forma-
tion of a committee to study the Maoist problem by the Bhat-
tarai government. It consisted only of the NC members. 
The lack of a coherent strategy by the state and political 
parties for the Maoists can be attributed to the non-power 
sharing attitude as well. The parties have spent most of their 
time, energy, and resources since 1996 attempting to form 
governments dominated by their own party or faction rather 
than cooperating with other parties to govern the country. 
This has resulted into extreme instability during both the 
hung parliaments of thel994-1999 period and the majority 
Parliament after 1999. The parties were often more intent on 
using the Maoists for their own partisan purposes than they 
were on forming coalitions to implement a coherent strategy 
against the Maoists. 
This same distrust has blocked the political parties from 
forming all-party coalitions in the districts and villages to 
counter the Maoists. 15 Yet cooperative attitudes and readi-
ness to compromise could have also sent positive signals to 
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the Maoists that a power-sharing culture had developed. lt 
might have shown the Maoists that they had a better chance 
of sharing power if they were to join the mainstream electoral 
politics. 
Ethnic Centra lization and Minority Participation in the 
Insurgency 
E\,en though the state is weak in terms of development and 
in providing services and security, it has affected the soci-
ety very deeply with its social and 
cultural policy of assimilation, ho-
mogenization, and mono-cultural 
nationalism. These policies seek to 
impose the values and norms of the 
dominant group on the society as a 
whole. 16 The state has promoted 
one language (Khas-Nepali), one 
religion (Hindu), one culture (hill 
'high caste' male), and one dress . 
lts impact on marginalized groups 
has been devastating. Many lan-
guages face extinction, and many 
groups have lost land and culture. 
The monopoly of the electronic 
media and education policy has 
played a very significant role in the 
assimilation process, because radio 
reaches every nook and cranny of 
the country, and education policy 
affects everyone who goes to school. After 1990, radio pro-
grams in some of the other major languages were begun, but 
Yatru (2058 v.s) found in 2001 that programs featuring the l4 
major ethnic languages were only 7.84% of the total broad-
cast time, while Khas-Nepali alone accounted for nearly 90 
percent; the remaining time was allocated to broadcasts in 
English, Hindi, and Urdu. Similarly, although some explicitly 
prejudicial discussions of minorities in the textbooks were 
dropped after the minorities protested, the books are still im-
bued with dominant group values. For instance, most of the 
heroes discussed in the social studies and Nepali texts are 
from the dominant group (Lawoti 2000a). 
Even though these policies reached their peak during the 
Panchayat period, they continue today. This is largely because 
of the ethnic centralization of the state. The decision-mak-
ing processes have no significant representation by mir:tori-
ties. Hence, minority perspectives, interests, and needs are 
not well represented or included in government policies. The 
resulting discrimination and the lack of social reforms have 
alienated the minorities . lt is important to note that although 
the political parties and factions may be in political/ideologi-
cal conflicts, they all converge in the accepting and promoting 
the hill Hindu religious ideology. 
Davidheiser (1992) argues that strong state policies have 
destabilizing impact in the society and may contribute to 
revolutions. ln Nepal, these cultural and social policies often 
destabilized the minority societies by uprooting them, mar-
gina lizing their cultures, alienating them from their ancestral 
lands, and undermining their communal stability. The desta-
bilization has produced a large population of fluid minorities. 
They are attracted to the Maoists who have promised them 
voice, recognition, rights, space, 
and dignity in their 'new regime.' 
The Maoists have raised the is-
sues of self-determination, cul-
tural and regional autonomy, and 
linguistic, religious, and gender 
equality more vociferously than 
other mainstream political parties. 
They have formed many ethnic lib-
eration fronts. These strategies have 
been more attractive to the minori-
ties facing cultural and communal 
destabilization as a result of state 
policies, as demonstrated by a high 
participation of the indigenous na-
tionalities, dalit, and women in the 
insurgency (Lawoti 2003). 
CONCLUSION 
l have argued in this paper that the centralized polity has 
contributed in the growth of the Maoist insurgency. The fur-
ther danger of the centra lized polity is that it may facilitate 
the growth of other types of violence , such as inter-ethnic 
conflicts. Riots between cultural and ethnic groups (Hill 
groups versus Tarai lowlanders, Hindus versus Muslims, and 
indigenous nationalities insurgency) have already taken place. 
The conflicts might grow if the issues producing them are not 
addressed (Bhattachan 2000a; Lawoti forthcoming). 
This study argues that the dramatic growth of the Mao-
ists has been fostered by the weakness of the state, not solely 
because of the organization, mobilization, and strength of 
the Maoists. This suggests that if the state capacity increases, 
as the security sector seems to have strengthened since mid 
2003, the Maoists would face greater difficulties in attacking 
security posts in the future . Hovvever, it does not mean that 
the Maoists can be wiped out. Furthermore, a military solu-
tion is not a viable long-term option for the country because 
of the high economic and socio-political costs. 
How can the problems of over centralization then be ad-
dressed? The solution is to diffuse power so that different 
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political and socio-cultural groups can access it. When dif-
ferent groups access power, they will no longer have need 
to rely on violent means. This calls for reforms in the state 
structured composition of political culture. The state should 
be decentralized, political culture made egalitarian, and the 
state positions of power be open equally to all cultural and 
ethnic groups. First, the unitary state has to be replaced by a 
federal one to provide cultural autonomy, enhance decentral-
ization, and promote economic development. Second, democ-
ratization of political parties will draw the disaffected into the 
political process. Democracy within the parties will ensure 
more accountability among political leaders and give voice 
and space to political activists. For instance, if the local po-
litical parties were to elect candidates for public offices such 
as Parliament through party grassroots cadres' voting, then 
the cadres' voices and influence may increase within political 
parties. Third, proportional electoral system can distribute 
resources (seats in elections) more judiciously. Affirmative 
action and policies to address historical discrimination and 
minority group concerns will also facilitate egalitarian distri-
bution of resources. 
No single remedy will work in Nepal because the problems 
are deep and wide. My recommendations will not control the 
Maoists insurgency immediately. In the short run, a settlement 
between the insurgents and the state is essential. However, a 
mere settlement is not enough to prevent violent conflicts in 
the future. Widespread structural, attitudinal, and cultural 
reforms are warranted to guide the country toward a more 
egalitarian path. As the society moves toward a more egalitar-
ian structure, the rationale for violent conflicts will lessen. 
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ENDNOTES 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the conference 
on the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal, 31st Annual South Asia Con-
ference, University of Wisconsin at Madison, October 10, 2002. I 
would like to thank john Metz for excellent feed back and editorial 
assistance and Mary Des Chene, Susan Hangen, and the partici-
pants of the conference for feedback. 
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2 The judicial review and constitutional rigidity appear to en-
sure power sharing but if we analyze their broader role we ·see that 
they promote rnajoritarianism. For instance, because of rigidity in 
amending the Constitution it is difficult to reform the political in-
stitutions that perpetuate the domination of the dominant group. 
Likewise, since the Supreme Court interprets the Constitution, 
judicial review depends largely on a Constitution that has concen-
lt'a ted power in the executive and discriminates against minorities. 
3 One distinction between unitary centra li zed and decentral-
ized polities is that in the former taxes are collected and spent by 
the center's agencies, \-vhile in the latter taxes may still be collected 
largely by the center but are returned substantia lly to local govern-
ments for delivering services. 
4 These countries remained democracies uninterrupted for more 
than 19 years, and the Freedom House rated them as 'free' (Lijphart 
1999) 
5 These organizations and mediums have grown considerably 
since 1990 but still have far less influences compared to similar 
organizations in other countries. One reason for their less influence 
is their lack of independence. 
6 Dalit means "the oppressed." It is the name reform leaders of 
"untouchable" groups have adopted to identify their groups. 
7 
"Indigenous groups" refers to Tibeto-Burman groups who 
had settled Nepal before the expansion of caste Hindus into the 
mountains from India. These groups had more egalitarian social 
systems. 
8 
"Madheshi " refers to people from Nepal's Tarai, the region in 
the extreme south that is the northern edge of the Gangetic plain. 
Madheshi have culture and languages similar to north India and 
they are distinct from the mountainous "Hills" of Nepal. 
9 The Newar are a Tibeto-Burman group who settled the Kath-
mandu basin more than 2,000 years ago and established a sophis-
58 
ticated , caste-based feudal society. They were conquered by caste 
Hindus in the late 18th century expansion that created modern Ne-
pal. Newar elites and merchants retained considerable power and 
share in positions of authority. 
1° Corruption charges against the NC ministers were finally 
lodged in October 2002 but till then corruption had spread widely 
and consequent disillusionment and public apathy had grown to 
substantial levels. 
11 A more recent opinion poll (Nepali Times 2002) has shown 
that the people have begun to blame the Maoists for the current 
crises in the country. This attitude change has come after the Mao-
ists began widespread destruction of development infrastructure, 
such as schools, health posts, telephone transmission towers, and 
Village Development Center (VDC) offices. In October 2003 Pra-
chanda, the supreme Maoist leader, issued a statement saying that 
the politburo meeting of the party has decided to stop the destruc-
tion of development infrastructures. As of the writing of this paper, 
however, it had not stopped. 
12 Even if we assume that the people may not have supplied infor-
mation to the administration because of the Maoist threat, the fear 
of the Maoists even in the district headquarters is an indication of 
the state's failure to provide security under its very nose. 
13 Newspapers have published complaints of senior security per-
sonnel on the lack of popular support toward the fight against the 
insurgency. 
14 In Rolpa, where the insurgency began, the NC and the Mao-
ists were political competitors, leading to frequent conflicts between 
them (INSEC 1999). 
15 See Ryan (1994) for the consequences of coalition formations 
for revolutionary movements. 
16 Please see Lawoti (2000, 2002, especially chapter 4), Subba et 
a!. (2000), FWLD (2000) for other examples of cu ltural discrimina-
tion. 
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